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PURPOSE 
After the longest work stoppage in the history of Major League Baseball only four 
years ago, baseball is in a delicate situation as it closes in on the end of its current 
collective bargaining agreement. Baseball has some issues to work through to ensure that 
it remains the national pastime because any type of labor strife in the next couple of years 
could possibly ruin the game forever. 
As a fan and hopefully a future employee of this great game, I am very concerned 
about the health of baseball. Many people have already written if off as they suggest the 
sport is headed for disaster. Although I disagree with these sentiments, I do think 
baseball needs to analyze its current state and make some changes. 
With that said, this paper attempts to analyze the state of baseball, identify its 
problem areas, and offer some recommendations for the next collective bargaining 
agreement. It will answer the following questions: 
• Is baseball in as bad of a situation as many make it out to be? 
• What is wrong with baseball? 
• What can be done to fix these problems? 
-.-
-
Chapter I 
STATE OF BASEBALL 
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The general consensus of people about Major League Baseball is that it is in a 
state of shambles and on track for destruction. However, these sentiments have been felt 
throughout its history. The natural question then is, "What is the true state of baseball?" 
This must be understood before any recommendations can be made as to what direction 
baseball needs to take in its next collective bargaining agreement. By analyzing some of 
the main controversial topics of today' s game, including competitive balance, its relation 
to payroll, team finances, and salaries, a better understanding of the current state of 
baseball can be achieved. 
Competitive Balance 
Competitive balance is the buzzword of the 1990s. People continue to complain 
about the competitive balance of Major League Baseball. So how bad is the competitive 
balance of baseball today? So bad that the 1990s is the most competitively balanced 
decade in baseball's history. Consider the following statistics for the 1990s: 
• 23 of the 28 teams (excluding the most recent expansion clubs in Arizona and 
Tampa Bay) have winning percentages between .476 and .523, which translate 
to 76 and 85 wins respectively in a 162 game season. The vast majority of 
these teams are clumped around .500. 
.-
-
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• Of the four teams with the worst winning percentages in the 1990s (Marlins, 
Tigers, Phillies, and Twins), three have reached the World Series and two 
have won it. 
• Every team has finished first or second in their division at least one time 
("The Truth"). 
These facts are great, but how do the 1990s stack up against other decades? The 
answer to that question is a definite, "Even better." The competitive balance of a decade 
can be measured in a number of ways. For example, Table 1.1 provides the percentage of 
teams that had extreme records-that is a wining percentage of .600 or better or 0400 or 
worse. As you can see, the total percentage of teams that finished with extreme winning 
percentages is lower each decade. Barring some crazy 1999 season, the 1990s will have 
the lowest percentage of teams finishing with extreme records. One factor to consider is 
that the 1990s has seen two expansions adding four new teams. However, the 
percentages presented in this table are extremely low and substantially better than any 
other decade. 
Decade 
1901-09 
1910-19 
1920-29 
1930-39 
1940-49 
1950-59 
1960-69 
1970-79 
1980-89 
1990-98 
TABLE 1.1 
.600+ 
21.5 
14.4 
15.0 
15.6 
15.6 
15.0 
9.1 
10.6 
5.8 
6.5 
.400+ 
23.6 
15.6 
15.0 
18.8 
13.1 
14.4 
12.6 
10.2 
8.l 
4.4 
Source: "It's All" 
TOTAL 
45.1 
30.0 
30.0 
34.4 
28.8 
29.9 
21.7 
20.8 
13.9 
10.9 
Another method to determine competitive balance is to analyze the distributions 
of winning percentages for teams. This analysis includes a number of statistical 
4 
calculations including standard deviation, ratio of maximum to minimum, and coefficient 
of variation. Table 1.2 shows the results from this type of analysis. The standard 
deviation for each year explains the statistical variation around the mean. Therefore, the 
lower the standard deviation, the less variation there was around .500 for all the teams' 
winning percentages. (The mean of .500 is obvious since it represents equal wins and 
losses, and each game includes a win and a loss.) The maximum over minimum figure 
represents what portion the minimum winning percentage in a season is of the maximum 
winning percentage. As those two get closer, the maximum/minimum figure approaches 
one. Therefore, the lower this figure is, the less variation there is. The coefficient of 
variation is the mean divided by the standard deviation. Since a lower standard deviation 
means more competitive balance, a lower coefficient of variation means the same. As 
you can see from the table, with the exception of 1998, the 1990s have some of the 
lowest of all these figures. This is indicative of a more competitively balanced decade. 
In case you are still not convinced, there is yet another way to demonstrate 
competitive balance. In 1990, the top eight teams in baseball in terms of wins averaged 
92 wins with the bottom nine teams averaging 72. In 1991, those figures were 91 and 70 
respectively. The last two years have not been much different. In 1997, the numbers 
were 92 and 71 while in 1998, they were 96 and 67. These 1998 figures are somewhat 
more extreme, but they can be attributed to the record-setting Yankees. They still do not 
differ much from the 1993 and 1994 seasons when the top eight teams won 94 and 95 
games respectively ("The Truth"). 
These methods have all shown that the 1990s is the most competitive decade, but 
1998 appears to be a drastic exception. In addition to the previosly mentioned data, four 
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teams won 60% of their games in 1998. That has not happened since 1985. Two of 
them, led by the record-setting New York Yankees, won 65% of their games. That has 
not happened since 1954 ("Wait"). So was 1998 a signal that the competitive balance 
was being destroyed? No, it was just what the data said it was - an exception. 
TABLE 1.2 
Distribution of Winning Percentages 
Standard Maximuml Coefficient 
Year Deviation Minimum Maximum Minimum Of Variation 
1952 .1029 .273 .627 2.297 .2058 
1955 .0914 .344 .641 1.863 .1828 
1958 .0519 .396 .597 1.508 .1038 
1962 .0957 .250 .624 2.497 .1914 
1965 .0880 .309 .630 2.039 .1760 
1968 .0600 .404 .636 1.574 .1200 
1972 .0734 .351 .619 1.764 .1468 
1975 .0721 .358 .667 1.863 .1442 
1975 .0750 .350 .613 1.751 .1500 
1982 .0646 .370 .586 1.584 .1292 
1985 .0778 .354 .623 1.760 .1556 
1988 .0742 .335 .642 1.809 .1484 
1990 .0559 .401 .636 1.586 .1118 
1991 .0597 .352 .605 1.719 .1194 
1992 .0632 .389 .605 1.555 .1264 
1993 .0750 .364 .642 1.764 .1500 
1994 .0683 .402 .649 1.614 .1366 
1995 .0714 .389 .694 1.784 .1428 
1996 .0619 .327 .615 1.881 .1238 
1997 .0594 .401 .623 1.554 .1188 
1998 .0833 .333 .704 2.114 .1666 
Source: www.baseballl.com 
Competitive Balance and Payroll 
However, the relationship between winning and team payroll is becoming more 
pronounced. At one point in baseball's history, buying a winning team was possible and 
even likely. Then free agency became part of the game, and teams have since done a 
poor job of signing free agents or paying a player according to his output. Average team 
salary has been related only tenuously to team performance (Zimbalist 96). That was 
-
-before the 1990s, which have shown some different results. Only a stronger relationship 
between winning and team payroll can explain these statistics: 
• In 1990, the best teams had a payroll of $17.7 million, while the worst teams 
had an average payroll of $16.1 million. These close payrolls for baseball's 
best and worst teams continued through 1992. Then things began to change. 
In 1998, the best 10 teams had an average payroll of $57.2 million, while the 
10 worst had a payroll of $23.8 million 
• In 1998, only one team in the bottom half of payrolls finished above .500. 
Only two teams in the top half of payrolls finished below .500. 
• During the last three years, only four teams with payrolls greater than $40 
million have made the playoffs. That is four out of the possible 24 berths. 
• Of the eight postseason teams in 1998, none were lower than twelfth in 
payroll. Compare that to the 1991 World Series when the Twins and Braves 
met for the title with the sixteenth and nineteenth highest payrolls. 
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• In 1990, the top third of all payrolls averaged 83 wins, while the bottom third 
averaged 78 wins. In 1991, the top third averaged 81 wins, while the middle 
third averaged 86 wins. Last year, the 10 highest payrolls averaged 92 wins, 
while the bottom 10 averaged 68 wins. 
Further evidence of this increased relationship between payroll and winning is 
found in Table 1.3. For each year, teams are divided into three tiers based on their 
payroll. As you can see, up until 1992, only six or fewer wins separated the big spenders 
from the little spenders. In fact, the middle tier won more games than the top tier in 
1991. However, the gap widened to 11 wins in 1993, 17 wins in 1995, and 24 wins in 
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1998. Again, 1998 appears to be an exception, but the three years before it all had 
differences of 15 or more wins between the top tier and the bottom tier. 
TABLE 1.3 
Average Average 
Payroll Wins 
(millions) 
Top $21.0 83 
1990 Middle 16.7 83 
Bottom 12.0 78 
Top 33.6 81 
1991 Middle 25.0 86 
Bottom 17.0 76 
Top 41.6 86 
1992 Middle 31.4 78 
Bottom 21.9 80 
Top 43.8 85 
1993 Middle 32.6 84 
Bottom 20.5 74 
Top 42.0 88 
1994* Middle 33.1 80 
Bottom 22.2 75 
Top 44.6 89 
1995* Middle 34.4 82 
-
Bottom 20.2 72 
Top 47.9 89 
1996 Middle 32.9 80 
Bottom 20.0 74 
Top 55.2 88 
1997 Middle 40.5 81 
Bottom 24.5 73 
Top 61.4 92 
1998 Middle 43.5 83 
Bottom 21.6 68 
* prorated to 162 games 
Source: "The Rich" 
One good sign is that it is not just about the money. Spending a lot on your team 
does not guarantee you success. John Moores, San Diego Padres owner" said, "Put it this 
way. Spending a lot doesn't mean that you're going to win. But not spending a lot 
means you aren't going to win." Consider the following statistics: 
• In the 1990s, the Los Angeles Dodgers have won 720 games, while the cash-
- strapped Montreal Expos have won 708 games. 
• The Baltimore Orioles had the highest payroll in 1998, but finished with a 
sub-.SOO record. 
• The Dodgers increased their payroll from $48.5 million to $60.7 million last 
year, but won five fewer games. 
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• In the 1990s, the Montreal Expos are Ith in winning percentage and only 28th 
in payroll. On the other hand, the New York Mets are 11 th in payroll and 21 st 
in wins, while the Anaheim Angels are 1 t h in payroll and 22nd in wins. 
Spending does not guarantee winning, but there is an increased relationship. 
Consider Table 1.4 which ranks each team in terms of winning percentage, payroll, 
attendance, city size, operating income, and total revenue for the 1990s. Of the top 10 
teams with the best winning percentages, eight of them are in the top 10 in payroll. To 
spend a lot, the team needs to be bringing in a lot of revenue. In terms of total revenue, 
seven of the ten best winning percentages are also top lOin total revenue. These 
relationships are not as strong for the middle 10 and bottom lOin winning percentages 
and their respective payrolls or total revenues. This indicates that you can win and 
compete without spending a ton or having a lot of resources at your disposal, but to be 
among the game's elite, you need to have those resources. 
This obvious link between those with the resources to spend on players and their 
higher winning percentages is causing some strife in baseball. Commissioner Bud Selig 
said, "You can see the disparity growing, both in terms of gross revenue and payroll. 
That's obvious. Clearly, disparity is the No.1 problem we have. It's only getting worse. 
It's a problem that has to be addressed." This disparity will be discussed at greater 
lengths later. However, a quick look at payrolls within divisions provides a perfect 
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example of what Selig is talking about. In the American League Central this year, the 
Cleveland Indians payroll is $50 million more than the Minnesota Twins. The same is 
true in the American League West where the Texas Rangers are outspending the Oakland 
A's by $50 million. In the American League East and National League East, it is even 
worse. The Yankees are outspending the Tampa Bay Devil Rays by $62 million in the 
American League, and the Mets and Braves are outspending the Florida Marlins by $60 
million. Selig continues his analysis of the situation by saying, "It's not just the 
spending. You wouldn't have disparity if everyone were spending. The concern is that 
some are spending while some cannot. This has to be addressed" ("The Rich"). 
TABLE 1.4 
Winning Operating Total 
Team Percentage Pa~roll Attendance Cit~ Income Revenue 
Braves .591 2 4 12 18 10 
-
Yankees .541 1 11 1 1 1 
White Sox .533 10 16 3 14 7 
Indians .523 16 9 16 10 11 
Dodgers .517 5 3 2 7 4 
Red Sox .517 3 8 7 5 3 
Orioles .515 4 2 4 2 2 
Blue Jays .515 6 1 10 11 5 
Astros .514 19 22 11 13 16 
Reds .512 9 12 24 28 21 
Rangers .511 8 7 9 6 9 
Expos .509 28 28 15 12 27 
Giants .505 7 19 5 20 14 
Pirates .500 26 24 21 21 25 
Mariners .493 15 13 14 22 18 
Athletics .493 18 18 5 19 13 
Cardinals .491 14 6 20 9 12 
Padres .490 22 20 19 16 23 
Rockies .484 24 5 22 3 19 
Cubs .483 13 10 3 8 8 
Mets .482 11 17 1 4 6 
Brewers .480 23 25 26 26 26 
Angels .480 12 14 2 23 17 
Royals .476 17 21 25 27 20 
Twins .471 25 23 17 25 24 
Phillies .470 20 15 6 17 15 
Tigers .454 21 26 8 24 22 
Marlins .450 27 27 13 15 28 
Source: "The Truth" 
---
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Knowing that they cannot compete, these teams that are lacking the resources to 
spend like the big teams have started trimming their already tiny payrolls. The thinking 
is "Why should I spend $30 million and finish fourth when I can spend $15 million and 
get the same result?" Therefore, they are unable and/or choose to not keep their best 
players. This creates a vicious circle. The team cannot afford to keep its best players. 
Then due to the escalating bonuses awarded in the draft, it is priced out of the market for 
the best young talent to replace the stars it lost. This leads to a drastic drop-off in 
attendance, which in tum reduces revenues, which makes it an even less attractive 
commodity for radio and television, which reduces visibility, which ... In the end, the 
team is left with fewer revenues than it originally started with, which were already not 
enough to field a competitive team. To help solve their problems, many of the struggling 
small market teams are trying to gain financing for new parks. These would serve as 
economic life rafts for their sinking franchises, but they are facing various obstacles 
preventing them from completing a deal ("The Rich"). 
John Hart, Cleveland Indians general manager, described the situation perfectly 
when he said, "You're always going to have teams with deeper pockets. This is America 
and this is capitalism. But at some point, baseball is going to have to determine what 
some teams can do and other teams, new ballpark or not, can't." This quote admits 
baseball needs to do something about this problem of the increasing impact spending is 
having on competitive balance. The game is in grave danger when baseball can no longer 
sell the possibility of contention in nearly half of its markets ("The Rich"). Since you 
almost have to be in the top half in payroll to finish above .500, baseball's current 
situation would lead some to see it as being in grave danger. 
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Team Finances 
The general consensus appears to be that baseball has too many teams who cannot 
compete on the field because they cannot compete financially. This is nothing new for 
baseball. Ever since free agency in 1976, people have been predicting the hopelessness 
of certain franchises. Four of the most recent examples happen to have had some of the 
most success the last couple years. 
• The Cleveland Indians acquired the label as the worst franchise in baseball 
during the late 1980s. However, the team's performance in the 1990s has 
helped increase its estimated value from $77 million (the second lowest in 
baseball) to $322 million (among baseball's top five valued franchises). 
• The Seattle Mariners had never finished a season with a winning percentage 
above .500. However, in the past three years, they have won two division 
titles and drew three million fans in 1997. 
• The San Diego Padres implemented the cost-cutting procedures discussed 
earlier by purging payroll in 1993. However, they rebuilt their team and had 
very successful seasons in 1996 and 1998 when they reached the World 
Series. 
• After losing 97 games in 1991, the Houston Astros have put together six 
straight winning seasons. That streak has been matched only by the Braves 
and Yankees ("Success"). 
Further, owners have always complained about their financial situation. It seems 
most teams are losing too much money or not making enough money to compete with the 
big boys. However, nobody really knows if the owners are telling the absolute truth since 
-, 
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only two teams have agreed to open their books to the public ("The Truth"). Selig claims 
only 10 teams turned a profit in 1998, yet five of the seven teams with the lowest payrolls 
did ("Success"). Does that mean that only five of the huge revenue-generating teams 
made money? 
Controversial claims about profits have been the norm in baseball for years. 
Major League Baseball claimed a loss every year from 1975 through 1985 and then a 
profit every year until the strike. The strike then led to huge losses for the industry. 
However, other sources claim smaller losses or even profits in some of those years. 
Economist Roger Noll looked at baseball's books in 1985. Although he would not 
specifically state the true financial situation of baseball, he did acknowledge that he 
found enough hidden revenue and accounting techniques to tum the claimed $50 million 
loss for 1984 to a $9 million profit (Grabiner). 
So what are the problems in determining the truth in profits for baseball? Three 
main problems arise when analyzing these figures. 
1. The use of related-party transactions in accounting. These transactions are 
between two entities that provide money to the same people. For example, an 
owner who owned the ballpark that the team played in could include the 
finances of the ballpark in the team's finances. 
2. The use of different accounting practices in team finances. For example, half 
of the purchase price of a franchise is attributed to player contracts, which are 
considered the purchase of short-term assets so they may be depreciated. The 
true asset purchased is the right to acquire future players. Plus, a paper loss is 
useful for tax benefits. 
--
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3. Part of the profits comes from appreciation of the franchise value. For 
example, George W. Bush was a principal investor in the Texas Rangers in 
1989 by contributing $606,302. When the team was sold in 1998, he received 
$14.9 million. Also, the Florida Marlins paid $95 million in expansion fees to 
enter Major League Baseball in 1994 and were sold for $150 million in 1998 
("Success"). 
Since profits are so hard to analyze, a different approach would be to look at the 
components of profits: revenues and costs. The three main sources of revenue for 
baseball teams are broadcasting, gate and stadium, and licensing. Broadcasting revenues 
come from both local and national sources. National broadcasting revenues are 
distributed equally among the teams, while the distribution of local broadcasting revenues 
is unequal and growing more so (Zimbalist 48). Local broadcasting revenues have been 
the focus of much debate lately as they continue to become more unequal. For example, 
in 1985, the difference between the highest and lowest local broadcasting revenues was 
$12.4 million. In 1990, that figure had grown to $52.6 million and is most definitely 
higher today (Zimbalist 48). The difference in national and local sources of revenue and 
trends associated with the two will be discussed more later. 
The second source of revenue, gate and stadium, is sometimes di vided into two 
sections to better analyze it. Gate revenue refers to revenue obtained primarily through 
tickets, while stadium revenue includes parking, concessions, luxury boxes, and stadium 
advertising. The share of ticket sales in total revenue has been falling, but gate revenue 
has grown in absolute terms due to rising attendance, increased ticket prices, and new 
income from lUxury boxes. For example, in 1950, 76% of total revenues came from 
--
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ticket sales and 14% came from concessions, stadium clubs, advertising, and parking. In 
1975, those figures were 61.5% and 12.8% respectively, and 40.6% and 13% in 1988 
(Zimbalist 51). 
Attendance has grown steadily. This is evident in Table 1.5. The only period 
where there was negative growth was during the strike. However, attendance has 
returned to pre-strike totals, partly due to the addition of two more teams. As mentioned 
previously, ticket prices have also increased, but not in real dollars. There have been 
minor fluctuations throughout history, but they have remained essentially constant over 
time (Grabiner). There exists a common misconception that outrageous ticket prices are 
attributable to the increasing salaries. In fact, ticket prices are set at a point to maximize 
revenue. The additional cost of having another fan attend a game is almost nothing, so 
teams focus on the revenue generated. Therefore, ticket prices are not affected by 
differing costs such as increasing salaries or a lower television contract. A change in 
demand will impact ticket prices, however. For example, a new stadium or the signing of 
some free agents may dictate a greater demand to see the team play (Grabiner). 
Stadium, or venue, revenue has been the subject of much more attention in the 
1990s. As mentioned earlier, many teams have or are attempting to finance new state-of-
the-art, baseball-only parks. These new parks generate new interest and often come 
equipped with numerous, expensive lUXury boxes to generate even more revenue. This 
source of income is important because it generates tremendous amounts of revenue, but is 
not shared at all as part of baseball revenue sharing plan. Gate revenue, on the other 
hand, is shared partially (Zimbalist 57). 
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TABLE 1.5 
-
Attendance 
(millions) 
Total Attendance 
Year Attendance per Club 
1950 17.5 1.09 
1960 19.9 1.24 
1970 28.8 1.20 
1978 40.6 1.56 
1984 44.7 1.70 
1990 54.8 2.11 
1991 56.8 2.18 
1992 55.9 2.15 
1993 70.3 2.51 
1994 50.0 1.79 
1995 50.3 1.80 
1996 60.1 2.15 
1997 63.0 2.25 
1998 70.6 2.35 
Source: "Success" 
The final source of revenue, licensing, is a relatively newer source for baseball 
when compared to the other professional sports. Baseball has actually followed the lead 
of the NFL and NBA in their licensing practices. Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. 
was created in 1987 as the official trademark, licensing, publishing, and marketing arm of 
baseball teams. It is also in charge of protecting the trademarks of these teams. The 
royalties received on the sale of goods with these logos are then divided evenly among all 
the teams. Each team received about $2.7 million in 1990 and $3.7 million in 1991 
(Zimbalist 57). However, that figure has since dropped to about $1.7 million last year 
(www.mariners.org). 
So what is the revenue situation like in baseball today? As you can see in Table 
1.6, average team revenues continue to grow. Since 1990, average team revenues have 
grown at an average of 8.8% per year. This includes the strike, which drastically lowered 
revenues for two years before they returned to pre-strike levels. More importantly, 
-however, is looking at the distribution of average team revenues since the common 
perception is that teams are unable to compete due to financial reasons. Many factors 
impact the variation of team revenues, but two particular ones account for 75% of the 
variation. These factors include: 
1. Each one million in population is worth $2.9 million in revenues. 
2. Each one point increase in winning percentage from the year before adds 
about $29,000 in revenues (Scully 119). 
TABLE 1.6 
Growth of Average Team 
Revenues 
(millions) 
Year 
1970 
1977 
1983 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
Revenue 
$ 5.7 
9.0 
20.1 
52.1 
57.9 
60.9 
63.4 
40.4 
50.4 
66.0 
79.1 
88.8 
Source: Zimbalist 58 and www.baseballl.com 
The data seems to indicate that the variation in average team total revenues is 
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widening. This data is presented in Table 1.7. As you can see, the maximum/minimum 
value and coefficient of variation have developed a generally increasing trend. This 
indicates a widening gap between those who have the resources and those who do not. 
Most of this increase can be attributed to the increased growth of local revenues. Up 
through 1992, local revenues grew considerably more unequal, but there was an 
equalizing trend in overall revenues among teams because national sources of revenue 
-
, 
--
-
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were growing more rapidly and obviously shared equally among the teams (Zimbalist 
98). This is evident in the table as both the maximum/minimum value and coefficient of 
variation decreased through 1992, representing less variation. However, there has been a 
reversal in that trend. An increased growth rate of local revenues coupled with similar 
national revenues divided among more teams has lead to increased variation in team 
revenues (Zimbalist 101). 
TABLE 1.7 
Distribution of Team Total Revenues 
(millions) 
Standard Maximum! Coefficient of 
Year Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum Minimum Variation 
1929 .758 .369 .358 1.669 4.664 .4864 
1939 .761 .361 .249 1.355 5.436 .4737 
1950 2.002 .821 .737 4.212 5.716 .4100 
1980 12.795 5.119 5.517 26.241 4.787 .4000 
1986 28.701 9.320 NA NA 3.161 .3247 
1990 51.715 15.837 34.000 98.000 2.882 .3062 
1991 57.850 16.733 38.800 91.100 2.348 .2892 
1992 60.900 17.l34 39.900 94.600 2.371 .28l3 
1993 63.400 16.438 43.000 107.600 2.502 .2593 
1994 40.400 11.807 25.000 71.500 2.860 .2923 
1995 50.400 16.971 24.900 93.900 3.711 .3367 
1996 66.000 23.751 39.900 l33.300 3.341 .3599 
1997 79.140 29.286 43.600 144.700 3.318 .3701 
1998 88.777 33.540 46.500 175.500 3.774 .3778 
Source: Zimbalist 98 and www.baseball1.com 
Where revenue is greatly affected by current club quality, cost, the other aspect of 
profits, is more associated with ex ante or planned quality than ex post or realized quality. 
In terms of cost, teams commit money prior to the season based on expected quality. 
Therefore, the current quality of the team and current total cost may not be closely related 
(Scully 125). In fact, numerous studies have been conducted to show that there is very 
minimal relation between costs, primarily salaries, and winning. However, if the team 
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spends wisely, then those costs can translate into wins. There are five basic direct cost 
categories. They include: 
1. Team costs (75-80% of total costs) 
2. Game 
3. Player development and training 
4. Sales and promotion 
5. General and administrative (Scully 123). 
U sing some of the same analysis that was used for revenues, an analysis of costs 
can be attained. Table 1.8 shows the growth of average team total costs. Since 1990, the 
average team total cost grew 11.5% per year. Considering the growth rate for revenues 
was 8.8%, this is not encouraging. 
TABLE 1.8 
Growth of Average Team Total 
Costs 
Year 
1970 
1977 
1983 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
(millions) 
Total Costs 
$ 7.0 
10.3 
22.6 
45.2 
53.0 
57.6 
57.3 
44.9 
48.3 
58.7 
76.6 
86.9 
Source: Zimbalist 60 and www.baseballl.com 
Even more importantly than total team costs are average team payrolls since they 
constitute a vast majority of a team's costs. Plus, salaries are generally perceived to be 
growing much faster than revenues. Table 1.9 shows the growth of average team 
--
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payrolls. Obviously the strike-shortened seasons of 1994 and 1995 experienced a drop-
off in salaries, but so did 1998, which is very abnormal since the definite trend is 
upwards. Since 1990, the growth rate for average team payrolls per year is about 17%. 
This is about double the average growth rate per year for revenues and may be cause for 
alarm if the trend continues. 
TABLE 1.9 
Growth of Average Team 
Payrolls 
(millions) 
Year 
1980 
1986 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
Payroll 
$ 3.6 
10.4 
17.4 
26.2 
35.2 
35.8 
25.6 
31.2 
35.4 
45.2 
41.1 
Source: Zimbalist 99 and www.baseballl.com 
The players' argument would be that salaries have had to increase at a faster rate 
in order to reach the point where salaries made up an acceptable percentage of revenues. 
The players have fought hard so that they were earning X% of revenues in salaries. 
Table 1.10 shows the percentage share of revenues that payrolls constitute. Ignoring the 
strike years, this share has increased steadily until it leveled off around 57% in 1992, 
1993, and 1997. 
Like revenues, the important aspect of this payroll analysis is determining the 
variation of average team payrolls. Basically, this analysis indicates the difference 
between the big spenders and those who do not have the money to spend. Table 1.11 
shows the distribution of team payrolls. Unlike revenues, no definite trends can be 
--
20 
identified in the maximum/minimum value and coefficient of variation. Both are 
obviously higher in the 1990s than in previous decades as evident by the higher variation 
values, but a significant trend has not developed for the 1990s. It is interesting to note 
the extreme values for 1998. Both the maximum/minimum and coefficient of variation 
are higher than any other year in the table by far. The early reports on 1999 salaries 
indicate that these values will not be near as high as 1998, but similar to other 1990s 
figures. 
TABLE 1.10 
Salary Share in Team Revenues 
(%) 
Year 
1974 
1978 
1982 
1986 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
Salary 
Share 
17.6 
25.1 
41.1 
40.0 
33.5 
45.3 
57.8 
56.5 
63.4 
61.9 
53.6 
57.2 
46.3 
Source: Zimbalist 87 and www.baseball1.com 
Combining the findings from the revenue and payroll analysis, a general 
conclusion can be drawn that the variation in revenues and spending definitely seem 
greater in the 1990s and appears to be increasing. This translates into a greater gap 
between the "haves" and the "have nots." So how big is this gap? Table 1.12 provides 
an interesting look at that gap. It shows the largest team payroll, smallest team revenues, 
and the ratio of these two figures for each year. That ratio is much higher today than it 
was in 1990 or 1980. Ignoring the strike years, it appears that it may have reached a 
.-
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plateau since the last three years have had ratios within .05 of each other. However, that 
means that the largest payroll in baseball is more than one and one-half times greater than 
the team with the smallest revenues. That is cause for concern. 
Year 
1929* 
1939* 
1950* 
1980* 
1986* 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
Mean 
5.884 
5.708 
10.814 
3.569 
10.379 
17.420 
26.190 
35.200 
35.800 
25.600 
31.200 
35.400 
45.240 
41.080 
TABLE 1.11 
Distribution of Team Payrolls 
(millions) 
Standard Maximum! 
Deviation Minimum Maximum Minimum 
1.358 3.511 9.144 2.604 
1.548 3.606 9.037 2.505 
2.766 5.853 16.290 2.783 
1.230 1.375 6.073 4.416 
3.051 4.696 16.441 3.500 
4.000 12.600 23.600 1.873 
7.045 12.100 39.200 3.240 
11.162 10.100 59.300 5.871 
11.987 12.200 56.200 4.607 
6.826 11.100 37.100 3.342 
9.281 12.100 50.500 4.174 
12.525 17.500 63.000 3.600 
13.548 17.300 69.700 4.029 
17.514 8.318 71.861 8.639 
* team average salary multiplied by 25 (roster limit) 
Source: Zimbalist 99 and www.baseball1.com 
TABLE 1.12 
Big Market vs. Small Market 
A comparison of the largest annual payrolls and the 
smallest annual revenues 
(millions) 
Year Largest Smallest Largest PayrolIl 
Pa;rroll Revenues Smallest Revenues 
1980 $ 6.1 $ 5.5 1.11 
1990 23.6 34.0 .69 
1991 39.2 38.8 1.01 
1992 59.3 39.9 1.49 
1993 56.2 43.0 1.31 
1994 37.1 25.0 1.48 
1995 50.5 24.9 2.03 
1996 63.0 39.9 1.58 
1997 69.7 43.6 1.60 
1998 71.9 46.5 1.55 
Source: Zimbalist 99 and www.baseballl.com 
Coefficient 
of Variation 
.2308 
.2712 
.2558 
.3446 
.2910 
.2296 
.2690 
.3171 
.3348 
.2666 
.2975 
.3538 
.2995 
.4263 
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Salaries 
This discussion of payrolls provides the background for the other much-discussed 
aspect of baseball - salaries. As long as people are being paid millions of dollars to play 
a game, people are going to question the amount ballplayers are being paid. Before any 
judgements can be made though, the salary system of baseball must be analyzed. Table 
1.13 shows the average and median salary for selected years from the birth of free agency 
in 1976 to last year. There is an obvious upward trend for the average salary with smaller 
percentage increases the last couple of years. However, the median salary has obviously 
increased, but the trend is not a smooth upward direction. The most obvious observation 
may be the drastic difference between the average and median salary. This is indicative 
of a system of many lower paid ballplayers and a few much higher paid players 
increasing the average salary. 
Year 
1976 
1980 
1984 
1988 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
TABLE 1.13 
Average Salary 
Average 
$ 52,300 
146,500 
325,900 
430,688 
589,483 
845,383 
1,012,424 
1,062,780 
1,154,486 
1,094,440 
1,101,455 
1,314,420 
1,378,506 
Median 
NA 
NA 
$229,750 
235,000 
350,000 
412,000 
392,500 
371,500 
450,000 
275,000 
300,000 
400,000 
428,500 
Source: www.usatoday.com 
Why do baseball players make so much money? Baseball players possess a rare 
talent, and the supply of talented ballplayers is very limited. Whenever there is a great 
demand for scarce talent, the system bids up the price (Scully 151). This situation is 
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similar to entertainers who demand even higher salaries (Scully 152). It is interesting to 
note that athletes receive much more public criticism for making $5 million a year to play 
a sport, when entertainers can demand $20 million for a single movie. 
Some specific factors are crucial to the determination of player salaries. These 
include the overall quality of player performance, weight or fraction of the player's 
contribution to team performance, experience of the player, and popularity or 
recognizability of the player to fans (Scully 156). A different approach to determination 
of player salaries is the marginal revenue approach. The value of a player to his team is 
his marginal revenue. Studies covering this topic typically look at marginal revenue 
product (MRP), which is determined by finding the impact team batting or pitching have 
on winning percentage and then the impact of winning percentage on revenue. From 
1984 to 1989, an extra win was worth $400,000. Projecting this to revenues in 1994, a 
win would be worth $1 million (Grabiner). Therefore, a player who contributed five 
more wins to his team would be worth $5 million. 
However, studies have shown that there appears to be a stronger relationship 
between salaries and service time than salaries and MRP. Every additional year of 
service increased salary by $78,700 (Zimbalist 93). This is evident in Table 1.14, which 
shows the average salary for a player with X years of service in 1990. The data shows a 
definite upward trend with a few exceptions. The automatic rise in salaries over time is 
not just a seniority effect since a player's performance also increases over his career up to 
a point (Scully 157). However, the earnings growth with seniority has been shown to be 
largely independent of productivity (Blass 268). 
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,- TABLE 1.14 
Mean Salary and Years of Service, 1990 
Years of Number of 
Service Players Mean Salary 
0 172 $ 108,396 
1 90 154,728 
2 68 262,810 
3 67 593,038 
4 66 760,201 
5 55 1,018,120 
6 43 1,047,719 
7 47 956,515 
8 29 1,191,424 
9 20 1,280,542 
10 15 1,229,979 
11 14 920,940 
12 18 1,320,307 
13 7 1,273,150 
14 4 1,068,764 
15+ 20 1,398,812 
Source: Zimbalist 83 
There also appears to be a stronger relationship between salary in a given year and 
-
performance in the previous year rather than the current year. This is evidence of the 
uncertainty of salary determination and the variability of player performance from year to 
year (Zimbalist 93). Frankly, this makes perfect sense since a player is usually paid 
based on the previous year's performance. Past performance is then projected into future 
performance and a salary is based on that information. 
Another interesting facet of salary determination is the debate of exploitation. 
Exploitation refers to the underpayment of some players. This analysis usually involves 
comparing salaries to players' MRPs. The general trend is that players with less than two 
years experience are drastically underpaid, those with two to five years experience are 
somewhat underpaid, and those with six or more years of experience are overpaid 
(Zimbalist 92). However, more recent research indicates that the underpayment of 
younger players, which was commonly attributed to exploitation, may be explained by 
-the surplus necessary to recoup the team's investment in the player during his minor 
league training (Krautmann 93). The other question associated with this information is 
why a player would be played above his MRP or in other words, why a veteran tends to 
be overpaid. This question involves the following possible reasons: 
• Misguage of player's worth by management 
• Value to the team is greater than his actual physical product, or by signing a 
player it ensures another team cannot get him 
• Seek team stability so sign him to a long-term deal 
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• Team is not actually maximizing profits 
• Player's worth goes beyond what he contributes on the field (Zimbalist 94). 
This concept of signing players to long-term deals has also caused considerable 
debate in baseball. Teams continue to try to lock-up young players for many years to 
prevent having to pay more money down the road and to ensure team stability. Some 
people argue that long-term deals cause players to develop a sense of complacency and 
lack of desire since they have guaranteed income for future years. Others argue that 
players are motivated by winning and that the money situation does not playa role. 
However, there has been some concrete evidence supporting the former argument. 
Consider the following statistics: 
104 (Unnamed) Hitters 
Year before signing a multiyear contract: 133 games; 13 homers; 63 RBI; .280 avg. 
Year after signing multiyear contract: 124 games; 11 homers; 56 RBI; .273 avg. 
Second year after signing: 117 games; 12 homers; 54 RBI; .267 avg. 
Third year after signing: 118 games; 10 homers; 53 RBI; .263 avg. 
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57 (Unnamed) Pitchers (Starters and Relievers) 
Year prior to signing multiyear contract: 39 games; won 12; lost 9; 3.33 ERA 
Third year after signing mUltiyear contract: 35 games; won 9; lost 8; 3.91 ERA ("Balls" 232) 
This data definitely supports the notion that long-term deals cause players to produce at a 
lower level and less often due to injuries. This may suggest that long-tenn deals are bad 
for the game and may need to be analyzed. 
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Chapter II 
TOPICS TO BE ADDRESSED 
The 1990s can be labeled as the most competitive decade in the history of 
baseball. However, an increasing number of teams enter the season with almost no 
chance to compete for a title. Much of this disparity can be attributed to the growing 
disparity in the finances of the "haves" and "have nots." Therefore, baseball needs to 
make some changes to make the playing field more even as it heads towards its next 
collective bargaining agreement. These changes can be focused primarily on the topics 
discussed earlier, mainly revenues and costs. 
To create a leveler playing field by limiting the variation in team finances, there 
are two options: 
1. Establish some cost containment mechanisms to limit spending, primarily on 
salaries. 
2. Develop some method to provide more revenues for the teams lacking the 
resources to compete in today's game. 
The first option results in less money being invested in the game as the teams that have 
the resources would simply save the money they would have spent on salaries and keep it 
as profit. Personally, I would rather see that money staying in the game making it an 
overall better product. I would much rather see 30 higher quality teams all competing for 
a title than 30 weakened teams competing for a title. However, some type of cost 
containment mechanisms need to be established since salaries continue to grow faster 
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than revenues. Therefore, combining the two options and applying them to the more 
controversial topics facing the game today including revenue sharing, payroll cap or tax, 
salaries, and the amateur draft may give baseball its best option. 
Revenue Sharing 
Following the lead of the NFL, baseball has addressed the increasing variation in 
team revenues by implementing a new revenue sharing program to share more revenues. 
Baseball used to only share national revenues, such as national broadcasting and 
licensing revenues, and a small percentage of gate revenue. However, the new plan 
developed during the strike called for the sharing of 22% of local revenues after 
deductions for certain expenses. This plan was to be phased in so that baseball would be 
sharing 60% of this level in 1997,80% in 1998, 85% in 1999, and 100% after this year 
(Grabiner). Of course, the sharing of local revenues is in addition to the sharing of 
national revenues, which accounted for $16.5 million per team in 1998. These levels 
result in the sharing of roughly 18% of all revenues, compared to 54% for the NFL 
(Badenhausen). An additional aspect of the new revenue sharing plan is the luxury tax, 
which will be discussed in more detail later. 
This agreement has provided some poorer teams with more resources to compete 
and theoretically may act as a cost containment mechanism. However, the current 
consensus is that it is not enough. In 1998, the top 13 revenue-generating teams 
contributed $100 million to the 15 teams with the lowest revenues. The Yankees were 
the biggest contributor by writing a check for $13 million. The Expos were the biggest 
benefactor as they received a check for $13 million. The Reds, Pirates, and A's all 
received $6 million (Badenhausen). 
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As for impacting salaries, revenue sharing should lower salaries since it takes 
money away from those teams that have the money to spend on players. However, if the 
teams benefiting from the agreement spend these new revenues, the effect should not be 
too great or even present. The effect on players would be similar to a payroll tax 
theoretically. The effect on the owners would be different from a payroll tax since they 
would pay a higher fixed sum with a tax on revenues than a tax on payrolls (Grabiner). 
However, there are some obvious problems with the agreement that need to be 
addressed. The amount of revenue shared obviously has not been enough since the great 
variation in total team revenue and spending continues to increase. Many of the small 
market teams want to share more local revenues, especially local television money. For 
example, the New York Yankees generate more than $70 million a year from local 
television sources, while the Kansas City Royals bring in less than $5 million a year 
("Looking"). Some teams, like the New York teams, Chicago teams, and Atlanta Braves 
have deals with superstations that generate tremendous amounts of revenue that is not 
shared. However, these requests have met great resistance from large market teams. Not 
only will these teams lose revenues by sharing more money, they fear these smaller teams 
will pocket the money resulting in huge profits. They will only listen to proposals 
detailing increased revenue sharing plans if there is a salary cap which will guarantee 
their own profits and force small market teams to spend the revenues they receive 
(Grabiner). Last year was a perfect example of what these teams fear. The main 
benefactors of the agreement, the Expos, Reds, and A's, each lowered their payrolls in 
1998. Sure they were eliminated from the pennant races early, but they also made a 
profit. The Expos finished with an operating income around $5.6 million, the A's 
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finished with about $3.3 million, and the Reds also had a slight profit. Some of the main 
contributors, the Mets, Dodgers, and Red Sox, all lost more than $5 million mainly due to 
being big donors to the revenue sharing system (Badenhausen). 
Payroll Cap or Tax 
The two main cost containment mechanisms are a payroll cap and a payroll tax. 
A payroll cap is a predefined limit that teams must keep their payroll costs below. Most 
caps also include a floor, which is a minimum amount teams must spend on payroll. 
Both the NFL and NBA have salary caps. The owners in baseball have expressed their 
desire for a cap the last 15 years. They really pushed hard for one during negotiations 
during the strike, but the players are definitely opposed to any cap. Plus, salary caps 
present three major problems: 
1. They limit what the superpowers can spend on players, but do nothing to 
increase the revenues for small market teams so that they can reach the floor. 
This problem calls for some sort of revenue sharing plan. 
2. There are numerous ways to circumvent the cap, such as large signing 
bonuses. This is definitely a problem in the NFL where the same teams find 
new ways to get around the cap. 
3. Perhaps most importantly, the players' union is very much opposed to the idea 
of a cap ("Looking"). 
Some small market teams have also suggested a cap on scouting and player 
development expenses (Grabiner). However, this idea presents a couple major problems. 
First, these departments for most teams are already thin. Scouts have too much area to 
cover as it is. Second, teams that want to focus spending on this area should not be 
-. 
-
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penalized since it is probably the most important part of building a successful team. 
Third, like the problems identified with the regular cap, teams will find ways to get 
around it (Quinn). 
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The second cost containment mechanism listed here is the luxury tax or payroll 
tax. This is a tax paid by any team that spends money on players above a predetermined 
figure. The revenue generated from the tax is then distributed to the teams with the 
lowest revenues. Theoretically, a luxury tax would create a new equilibrium where teams 
below the tax threshold would be able to sign more star players, and the taxed teams 
above the threshold would hire fewer stars. This would obviously improve the 
competitive balance between taxed and untaxed teams in favor of the untaxed teams 
(Gustafson 153). Since most of the higher revenue generating teams are the teams with 
the higher payrolls, this would also improve the competitive balance between the "haves" 
and "have nots." 
How does this work? For a team above the threshold, a player's cost becomes his 
salary plus the tax to be paid. So if the tax was 10% and the team felt the player's value 
was $4 million, that team would probably only offer the player $3.6 million since it 
would have to pay $400,000 in taxes. For a team below the threshold, the player's cost is 
simply his salary so it could offer the player $4 million. If the player decided to sign 
where he would earn the most money, he would sign with the untaxed team. 
How well the lUXUry tax would contain costs depends on the marginal tax rate. 
As far as how teams are affected, a very high tax rate would have the same effect as the 
cap because it would severely restrict spending. A lower tax rate would reduce salaries, 
but not prevent teams over the limit from competing. As for the impact on players' 
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salaries, the tax rate would correspond to the same amount in reduced salaries (Grabiner). 
For example, a 5% tax rate would result in a 5% depression in salaries as was shown 
earlier. On the other hand, a 75% tax rate would result in a 75% depression in salaries 
making it unlikely teams could go over the threshold. 
Baseball is the only professional sport with a luxury tax. The current agreement 
calls for a tax through 1999 with no tax in 2000 and a union option for 2001. It also 
called for a marginal tax rate of 35% in 1997 and 1998, and 34% in 1999. The tax 
threshold was set at either a) $51 million in 1997, $55 million in 1998, and $58.9 million 
in 1999 or b) half way between the fifth and sixth highest payrolls, whichever was 
greater. Therefore, it would only apply to five teams at the most (Grabiner). When 
figuring the luxury tax, payrolls are for the 40-man rosters and include averages of 
multiyear contracts plus $5,737,269 to cover health and pension benefits; clubs medical 
costs; insurance; workman's compensation, payroll, unemployment, and Social Security 
taxes; spring training allowances; meal and tip money, All-Star game expenses; travel 
and moving expenses; postseason play; and college scholarships (www.usatoday.com). 
The money generated from the tax in 1999 is found in Table 2.1. However, the critics of 
the lUXury tax are not sold on its merits. Larry Luccino, the San Diego Padres President, 
says, "It's nearly a joke." 
TABLE 2.1 
Team 1999 Payroll Tax 
Los Angeles $97,046,647 $5,150,347 
Yankees 94,392,399 4,247,903 
Orioles 93,861,230 4,067,305 
Braves 84,170,644 772,506 
Mets 83,443,145 525,156 
Source: www.usatoday.com 
-
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Salaries 
Related to the containment of team payrolls is the containment of individual 
salaries. Salaries get much public criticism, but three major salary-related topics have 
received extensive criticism recently: contracts, salary arbitration, and free agency. The 
huge contracts of today, both in terms of length and amount, have resulted in some 
serious problems recently. First, the sheer amount of contracts today has given baseball a 
black eye. The big deals stars sign set the tone for the rest of the market and gain the 
most attention. Most fans do not gripe as much about the good player who signs for $5 
million a year, but rather the star who signs for $12 million a year. As mentioned earlier, 
these deals also cause the average salary to vastly vary from the median salary. Second, 
the increasing length of these contracts presents trouble for management. Management 
has started a newer trend of signing players to longer-term deals to ensure team stability 
and give players even bigger deals. However, it locks teams into paying that player that 
much money regardless of the player's performance. This leads to the third problem of 
the contracts being guaranteed. Teams have to pay that player regardless of his 
performance unless the player can be traded. Numerous teams have been caught in a 
bind recently due to cheaper players outplaying veterans, who have failed to play up to 
the expectations of the contract. Management is partly to blame in this case since veteran 
players are often paid above their marginal revenue product, as was mentioned earlier. 
The only reasons that a club may terminate a contract are if the player: 
1. Fails to demonstrate good citizenship and sportsmanship, keep himself in first 
class physical condition, or fails to obey the club's training rules. 
2. Fails to exhibit sufficient skill. 
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3. Fails, refuses, or neglects to render other services stipulated in the contract 
(Scully 23). 
Another controversial topic associated with salaries is salary arbitration. Both the 
owners and players have agreed to get rid of salary arbitration if an alternate plan could 
be developed. However, the two sides cannot agree on anything since the owners want to 
keep younger players under contract longer before they can test free agency, and the 
players want access to free agency sooner in a player's career. 
Salary arbitration actually acts as a middle point between these two positions. It 
still gives the team exclusive rights to that player, but the player does not have to accept 
whatever the team offers. Salary arbitration is available to the top 17% of third year 
players and all players with at least three years of service. If a team and player are unable 
to come to terms, the team can offer the player salary arbitration or release him. If he is 
released, he becomes a free agent and his old team is unable to negotiate with him until 
May 1. A player cannot force the team to offer arbitration, but if the team offers it and he 
accepts, both sides submit their proposed salaries to an arbitrator. The arbitrator must 
then select one side's offer, which is why it is called final-offer arbitration. This 
discourages both sides from submitting unreasonable demands. The deal then is for one 
year with no incentive clauses (Grabiner). 
Its main purpose is not to determine salaries, but to give incentive for players and 
clubs to negotiate (Marburger 74). However, should they be unable to settle on a 
contract, the arbitrator must decide. Team finances and the lUXury tax cannot be 
considered when making a decision. Also, the decision usually is based on the salaries of 
comparable players (Grabiner). The arbitrator tries to replicate the salary determination 
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in the free agent market, but also incorporates an experience factor (Marburger 76). This 
means that the arbitrator tries to guess the value the player would have as a free agent, but 
still considers that the player has significantly less experience. 
The results of salary arbitration throughout history are shown in Table 2.2. Two 
interesting observations can be made from this data. First, the number of players who file 
for arbitration that actually experience arbitration have decreased to the 1990s level of 
around 15%. Most cases are never heard by an arbitrator. Second, the winning 
percentages for the two sides are both about 50%, with the owners winning slightly more 
often. This leads many people to believe that arbitrators simply flip a coin. This would 
make sense since the arbitrators are selected at random from a pool of arbitrators that 
mayor may not have much knowledge of baseball. However, the evidence shows that 
they actually rely on the facts of the case (Burgess 109). 
There are a number of theories on how arbitrators actually determine which offer 
to choose. Some people argue that arbitrators engage in offsetting behavior. They act as 
compromisers even though it is final-offer arbitration by attempting to even out the 
decisions. The greatest chance for this to happen is when the same player comes to 
arbitration against the same team in successive years. However, more factors may be at 
work here since players facing arbitration for a second time are more likely to 
significantly lower the relative spread between their offer and the team's offer (Frederick 
47). Other people argue that arbitrators exhibit conservative behavior. In this case, they 
would be more likely to side with the team as the degree of divergence between the offers 
grows (Frederick 33). Finally, some people argue that arbitrators use another approach 
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called parity decisions where they look at the evidence, determine the market value, and 
select the offer closest to this value (Frederick 34). 
TABLE 2.2 
Number in Arbitration Arbitration Average 
Filing for Arbitration Awards to Players Awards to PlayerlManagement 
Year Arbitration Hearings (% ) (%) Management (% ) Offer Ratio 
1974 54 29 (54%) 13 16 1.19 
1975 38 14 (37%) 5 9 l.21 
1978 16 9 (53%) 2 7 NA 
1979 29 12(41%) 8 4 1.49 
1980 65 26 (40%) 15 11 1.44 
1981 108 21 (19%) 11 10 1.49 
1982 103 22 (21%) 8 14 1.53 
1983 88 30 (34%) 13 17 1.46 
1984 80 10 (12%) 4 6 1.51 
1985 97 13 (13%) 6 7 1.43 
1986 159 35 (22%) 15 20 1.45 
1987 108 26 (24%) 10 16 1.28 
1988 111 18 (16%) 7 11 1.27 
1989 131 12 (9%) 7 5 1.34 
1990 162 24 (15%) 14 10 1.48 
1991 157 17(11%) 6 11 1.51 
1992 157 20 (13%) 9 11 1.61 
1993 118 18 (15%) 6 12 1.65 
1994 93 16 (17%) 6 10 1.48 
1995 61 8 (13%) 2 6 1.59 
1996 76 10 (13%) 7 3 1.51 
Totals 2,011 390 (19%) 174 (45%) 216 (55%) 1.44 
Source: "Swings" 42 
The final topic associated with salaries that receives much criticism is free 
agency. This is actually related to the size of contracts since free agency is the main 
reason these contracts continue to grow. However, both sides appear relatively happy 
with the way free agency works. The conflict arises over at what point in a player's 
career it should be offered. Another related problem involves the final topic to be 
discussed, the amateur draft. Baseball has a method of compensation for teams who lose 
free agents to other teams. A draft pick is given to the team who loses the free agent by 
the team who signs him. What pick the team receives depends on a complicated formula 
- that labels a free agent as a Type A, B, or C free agent. These picks, known as 
--
-
"sandwich" picks are then chosen between the first and second rounds, thus devaluing 
later picks in the draft (Grabiner). 
Amateur Draft 
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The amateur draft is the other aspect of baseball that needs some changes made to 
it to make the playing field more even. Currently, the draft provides a means of selecting 
players for team's organizations. The selection rights are in reverse order of finish from 
last season. Once a player is selected, he is placed on the registration list. The club that 
selects him has exclusive contract rights with that player. If the player is unable to sign 
in a specified amount of time, he becomes eligible for reentry into next year's draft 
(Scully 21). All players from all countries are not eligible for the draft. Most 
international players eventually sign as free agents. In addition, other eligibility 
guidelines include: 
• High school athletes may sign once their high school eligibility ends. 
• High school dropouts are eligible if out of school for more than one year. 
• A player may not enter the draft during his college eligibility or as a freshman, 
unless he is 21 and between school years, between his junior and senior year, 
has completed his college eligibility, or flunked out or withdrew and has been 
out of school for more than 120 days (Scully 22). 
The draft was originally designed to improve the competitive balance. Before the 
draft's inception, all amateurs were free agents so the teams with the most money could 
offer higher signing bonuses to acquire the best young talent. Therefore" the draft was 
established to cut down on outlandish signing bonuses by giving one team exclusive 
rights to that player (Quinn). 
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However, some recent developments have caused some problems with the draft. 
For example, the draft kept signing bonuses in check until the 1980s when the big guys 
started giving huge bonuses. This set the precedent for future drafts since a player wants 
at least as much money as the same pick last year received. The increased use of agents 
has helped cause this drastic increase in signing bonuses, but the owners themselves are 
the primary reason (Quinn). Teams are not allowed to trade picks either. With these huge 
signing bonuses, some teams are unable to select players for fear of an inability to sign 
them. Teams then pass over these players because they are unable to trade their pick. 
Also, since international talent is not included in the draft, dealing with these players is 
just like it used to be before there was a draft. These amateurs are free agents and go to 
the highest bidder. Thus, the market has priced out small market teams ("Looking"). 
Finally, the "sandwich" picks have devalued later round picks so that the first selection of 
each successive round is worth less than it used to be. 
---
--
Chapter III 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
What can be done about these problems? The following suggestions attempt to 
address the problems mentioned here and improve the state of baseball. 
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Increased revenue sharing. The variation in team revenues is causing numerous 
teams to enter the season without any chance of winning a title. Some new sources of 
revenue need to be provided to those teams to give them the resources to compete. 
Obviously, the current system is not doing the job. I do not think revenues should be 
shared as much as they are in the NFL because the larger market franchises should still 
benefit from their location. Plus, John Hart, general manager of the Cleveland Indians, 
summarized the situation perfectly when he said, "You're always going to have teams 
with deeper pockets. This is America and this is capitalism. But at some point, baseball 
is going to have to determine what some teams can do and other teams, new ballparks or 
not, can't." So I propose the following revenue sharing program: 
1. Share all national sources of revenue, primarily national broadcasting revenue 
and licensing. This amounted to roughly $16.5 million in 1998. 
2. Share 30% of all remaining revenues, primarily local revenues. 
3. Distribute these shared revenues (excluding the national revenues) based on 
the schedule presented in Table 3.1. 
4. Distribute revenues from the lUxury tax as outlined in the following section. 
--
TABLE 3.1 
Team Total 
Revenue Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Percentage 
1.33 
1.53 
1.73 
1.93 
2.13 
2.33 
2.50 
2.67 
2.83 
3.00 
3.07 
3.13 
3.20 
3.27 
3.33 
3.30 
3.40 
3.47 
3.53 
3.60 
3.67 
3.83 
4.00 
4.17 
4.33 
4.53 
4.73 
4.93 
5.13 
5.33 
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New luxury tax and payroll floor. The increased revenue sharing provides the 
lower revenue-generating teams with the needed funds to compete. However, a payroll 
floor needs to be established to ensure that these teams attempt to use that money to put a 
better team on the field. Also, a new lUxury tax needs to be implemented to discourage 
teams from spending considerably over a certain level. Teams should not be capped at a 
certain limit because I believe that if teams want to spend more money on trying to put a 
better team on the field, they should not be totally limited. However, outlandish spending 
needs to be curbed. Therefore, my proposal for a new lUxury tax is as follows: 
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1. Payroll determinations will be based on last year's team total revenues. The 
basis for the lUxury tax and floor will be 55% of the median team revenue. 
The reason for using the median figure rather than the mean figure is to 
prevent the influence of extreme data. For example, the New York Yankees 
had revenues that were almost $25 million more than the next closest team in 
1998. This inflates the average team revenue figure. 
2. The payroll range (with the salary minimum or floor at one end and the luxury 
tax threshold at the other) will be 84% and 116% of the figure determined in 
step one. 
3. Implement an increasing tax schedule. There will be a new tax level for every 
increase of 10% of the figure found in step one over the tax threshold. For 
example, if the tax threshold was $55 million and 55% of the median team 
revenue was $50 million, the various tax levels would be $50 - $55 million, 
$55 - $60 million, $60 - $65 million, etc. until the highest payroll lies in a tax 
level. All money above the tax threshold will be taxed by an appropriate tax 
rate. The first tax level will have a rate of 25%, with each successive level 
increasing by 5%. The reason for this is that I do not want to penalize teams 
just over the tax threshold too much. What I want to concentrate on are those 
teams that spend substantially over the threshold. The tax schedule is 
presented in Table 3.2. 
4. Based on previous years' salaries, a majority of the teams fall in the third tax 
level, or at a tax rate of 35% which is the current tax rate. The differences are 
that more than five teams can be taxed (in fact, there is not limit to the number 
of taxed teams) and that the tax rate increases as teams vary from the tax 
threshold. 
TABLE 3.2 
Percentage of 
Median Team Revenue 
116 -126 
126 -136 
136 -146 
146 - 156 
156 - 166 
166-176 
176 - 186 
186 - 196 
Tax Rate (%) 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
5. The money generated from the lUxury tax would be distributed to the ten 
teams with the lowest total revenues after the revenue sharing outlined 
previously. This money would be distributed according to Table 3.3. 
TABLE 3.3 
Team Total 
Revenue Rank 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Percentage of 
Tax Money 
1 
3.25 
5.50 
7.75 
10 
10 
12.25 
14.50 
16.75 
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The question then becomes, "What kind of effect would this plan have on team 
finances?" Using these plans on 1998 would produce the following results: 
1997 median total team revenue - $75.15 million 
55% of $75.15 million - $41.3325 million 
Payroll floor (84% of $41.3325) - $34.72 million 
Tax threshold (116% of $41.3325) - $47.95 million 
42 
43 
TABLE 3.4 
Tax Schedule 
Tax Level Tax Rate (%) 
$47.95 - 52.08 25 
52.08 - 56.22 30 
56.22 - 60.35 35 
60.35 - 64.48 40 
64.48 - 68.62 45 
68.62 - 72.75 50 
TABLE 3.5 
Total Team Revenues 
(millions) 
Revenues 
1998 Contribute to Sharing Payroll Proceeds after Sharing 
Team Revenues Sharing Proceeds Tax from Tax 
Yankees $175.5 $47.7 $8.7 $7.97 $128.5 
Indians 149.7 40.0 10.0 4.06 115.6 
Braves 142.7 37.9 11.3 5.50 110.6 
Orioles 140.5 37.2 12.6 11.96 103.9 
Rockies 124.6 32.4 13.9 106.0 
D'backs 116.3 29.9 15.2 101.5 
Rangers 108.1 27.5 16.3 5.03 9l.9 
Dodgers 107.9 27.4 17.4 5.94 9l.9 
..- Red Sox 106.9 27.1 18.4 4.04 94.2 
Mets 99.7 25.0 19.5 3.75 90.6 
Cardinals 97.8 24.4 20.0 93.4 
Devil Rays 93.7 23.2 20.4 90.9 
Cubs 93.1 23.0 20.8 .47 90.4 
Angels 88.5 2l.6 21.3 .11 88.1 
Astros 82.5 19.8 2l.7 .09 84.3 
Mariners 81.3 19.4 2l.7 83.6 
Padres 78.9 18.7 22.1 1.53 80.8 
White Sox 74.1 17.3 22.6 79.4 
Blue Jays 73.4 17.1 23.0 79.3 
Giants 73.3 17.0 23.4 .14 79.6 
Marlins 69.5 15.9 23.9 $ .51 78.0 
Phillies 66.0 14.9 24.9 l.64 77.7 
A's 56.7 12.1 26.0 9.62 80.2 
Brewers 55.5 11.7 27.1 8.47 79.4 
Reds 54.4 11.4 28.2 6.20 77.4 
Tigers 54.2 11.3 29.5 5.06 77.5 
Royals 53.5 ILl 30.8 2.78 76.1 
Pirates 5l.7 10.6 32.1 3.92 77.1 
Twins 46.8 9.1 33.4 7.34 78.4 
Expos 46.5 9.0 34.7 5.06 77.3 
Replace arbitration with first-refusal free agency. First refusal free agency is 
when players are allowed to seek offers from other teams, but the team that they are with 
-
has the right to first-refusal. This means that a player receives an offer from another team 
--
and his team has the option to match that offer or refuse it. If the offer is matched, he 
stays with his team. If not, he signs with the other team for the terms of the offer. 
The following concepts need to be considered when replacing salary arbitration 
with first-refusal free agency: 
• Only about 15% of the cases filed ever reached arbitration so it served as a 
threat more than anything. 
• Arbitrators tried to value the player as if he was a free agent so the salaries 
under restricted free agency should not increase too much. 
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• However, any time a freer market develops, players' salaries are going to 
increase some because there are multiple teams bidding for the players' 
services. This does not bother me because younger players are generally 
considered to be underpaid anyway. Plus, many of these players suffer 
through some extensive time in the minors. According to many people, unless 
you experience the minor leagues, you have no idea of the hardships these 
players experience. Restricted free agency would provide a fairer market 
system and possibly compensate these players for their struggles in the 
minors. 
• The net effect on salaries would probably be negligible or even cause the 
average salary to decrease. A first-refusal system would definitely lower the 
salaries of free agents though. Figure A shows the effect adding a first-refusal 
system would have on free agent salaries as a whole. More players can 
become free agents so the supply increases from Sl to S2. The reason free 
agents earn such high salaries now is that they act like a monopoly. Each 
--
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player is the only player that can offer those specific skills. However, by 
increasing the number of players eligible to be free agents, there is a greater 
pool of players to select from to find the skills a team desires. Figure B shows 
the effect this type of system would have on normal free agents. The 
restricted free agents act like substitutes for the normal free agents. This 
decreases the demand for normal free agents from DJ to D2. Obviously the 
salaries of players in first-refusal free agency are going to demand higher 
salaries than if they were in salary arbitration, but how much depends on how 
well the arbitrators valued players according to a free market. Figure C shows 
the effect on salaries for these players. Now that these players are in the free 
agent market, there is a greater demand for them. This makes sense since the 
only demand for these players before was by their own team. 
FIGURE A FIGUREB FIGUREC 
• Thus, this system would increase the salaries of younger players and decrease 
the salaries of free agents. This would decrease the variation in salaries 
demanded by players and cause the mean and median salaries to become 
closer. It also would limit the extravagant contracts awarded to top-of-the-line 
free agents. 
-With these conclusions in mind, I have developed a proposal for a first -refusal 
free agency system. This plan is outlined as follows: 
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1. All players with service time between three and more years and less than six 
years are eligible. Basically, those players eligible for salary arbitration under 
the current system with the exception of the top 17% of third year players 
would be eligible for first-refusal free agency. Therefore, players would be 
bound to one team for the first three years of their careers; could participate in 
first-refusal free agency after their third, fourth, and fifth years; and 
participate in regular free agency after six years of service. 
2. Players would have the month of November to obtain offers from other teams. 
3. The player may only sign an offer sheet with one team during this period. 
4. The player's current team then has 15 days to match the offer or refuse it. If 
the offer is matched, the player stays with that team for the terms listed in the 
offer. If refused, the player is free to sign with the team he signed the offer 
sheet with for the terms outlined in the offer. 
5. All offers must be multiyear deals. That is, the offer must be for two years or 
more. This would provide a restriction on the number of players eligible for 
free agents to keep the number lower, provide some team stability, and limit 
player movement. 
6. If a team matches the offer, the increased salary paid to the player will not 
count towards the team's payroll in terms of applying the luxury tax to it. The 
player's previous salary will be counted towards the payroll when determining 
.-
-
-
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the lUxury tax. This encourages teams to resign their young players and limits 
player movement. 
Limits on contracts. As mentioned earlier, there are some aspects of contracts 
that need to be addressed to solve some problems. These problems include the length of 
the contract, sheer size of the contract, and the financial restrictions these deals put teams 
in when moving players. Therefore, I propose the following changes: 
1. Establish a maximum single year salary. This does not have to be too 
restrictive; however, some type of cost containment mechanism needs to be 
implemented to guide top-line salaries. These salaries tend to set the pace for 
the rest of the market and receive the most negative pUblicity. By capping 
them, it keeps salaries in general in check, lowers the extremes that cause the 
variation in the mean and median salary, and curbs some of the negative 
pUblicity. I think a fair cap on the maximum salary a player can achieve in 
one year is 16% of the previous year's median total team revenue (without the 
revenue sharing of local sources; just the national sources). Applying this to 
last year's median team revenue of $81.9 million, the maximum one-year 
salary would be $13.1 million. This includes all performance bonuses also. 
2. Establish a maximum contract length. In an attempt to offer free agents 
bigger deals and ensure team stability, teams have begun offering players 
longer deals. These cause many problems due to the invariability of player 
performance as the data presented earlier on long-term contracts showed. A 
maximum contract length is more of a safeguard for teams so that they do not 
become stuck with an underachieving player for many years. Players should 
,-
-
-
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not have to worry about it if they simply perform. If they continue to perform, 
they will earn quality money when their contract expires. I would place a cap 
of three years for contracts with an option for a fourth year for the team. This 
prevents teams from having their hands tied with complex deals, ensures 
players will continue to be motivated to perform as high levels, and lowers the 
huge contract deals the public reads about in the papers. 
3. Make the contracts not guaranteed any more. Too often a team is stuck with 
an underachieving player who is being outplayed by another player. Since 
teams are currently unable to release players without paying the player's 
maximum salary unless a team claims him off waivers, teams are stuck trying 
to trade big money, long-term deals. Currently, teams are not allowed to cut 
players for financial reasons. However, as was discussed earlier, teams can 
release players if they fail to exhibit sufficient skill. I would say that failing to 
produce up to the expectations of a $5 million contract would qualify here. 
Telling someone to take a pay cut or be released so that the team does not go 
over the tax threshold would qualify as a financial reason. I do not condone 
this. However, if a player is legitimately not performing up to certain 
standards, teams should have the opportunity to release him. I also do not 
think players should be cut without any compensation, but their entire contract 
is ridiculous. Perhaps a team would be responsible for paying the major 
league minimum to a player if it cuts him. This would not be too much of a 
financial burden on teams and provide players with some money. 
--
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4. Continue the minimum salary agreement from the current collective 
bargaining agreement. It calls for a minimum salary of $200,000 (Jennings 
202) with a cost-of-living increase for 2001. Again, I have no problem paying 
younger players more money, and I think $200,000 with a cost-of-living 
increase every year is more than fair. 
Draft changes. The current structure of the draft has caused many problems as 
mentioned earlier, mainly dealing with competitive balance. Not only has the current 
system priced some teams out of the market, it has also brought some negative pUblicity 
with the outrageous signing bonuses some amateurs are demanding. With that said, I 
think the draft needs the following changes implemented: 
1. Make the draft international. All players in the world that are eligible for the 
draft and express a desire to be drafted, should have to register with Major 
League Baseball. Therefore, this would eliminate the foreign players who 
cannot currently be drafted from acting as free agents and demanding 
outrageous signing bonuses. Plus, it would give all teams, regardless of their 
financial situation from being able to draft the best talent in the world. 
2. Eliminate the "sandwich" picks. These picks, given as compensation for the 
loss of free agents, devalue the picks later in the draft. The question then is 
whether teams should be compensated for losing free agents. If they are, I 
recommend that baseball use its current system of labeling players as Type A, 
B, or C free agents and then compensate teams with a first, second, or third 
round draft pick respectively. Personally, I do not think teams should be 
compensated for losing free agents. This encourages them to hold on to their 
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players. Plus, teams can simply do what the Baltimore Orioles did this year. 
They lost a number of free agents and were compensated accordingly, yet still 
signed a number of free agents. 
3. Develop a signing bonus schedule for draft picks. This would keep signing 
bonuses in check and thus prevent the draft from pricing some teams out of 
the market. I have developed a schedule of signing bonuses for each round of 
the draft. Table 3.6 shows the signing bonuses for each round. The last 
column is the difference each pick or round would receive from the preveious 
pick or round. For the first five rounds, the difference applies to each 
successive pick. For rounds six through fifty, the difference applies to each 
successive round with all players in the round receiving the same bonus. 
Draft Round 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6-10 
11-20 
21-30 
31-40 
41-50 
TABLE 3.6 
Signing Bonus 
Range 
$2,500,000 - 1,000,000 
992,500 - 775,000 
767,500 - 550,000 
542,500 - 325,000 
317,500 - 100,000 
98,000 - 80,000 
78,000 - 60,000 
58,000 - 40,000 
38,000 - 20,000 
18,000 - ° 
Difference between 
Picks or rounds 
$50,000 
7,500 
7,500 
7,500 
7,500 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
2,000 
4. Allow teams to trade draft picks. Coupled with the above signing 
bonus schedule, teams would know exactly how much a player is 
going to cost and could trade away picks if it knew it could not afford 
to sign that player. Also, this would allow teams to trade players away 
for picks to restock the minor league system or for other picks if there 
was a player in the draft that team wanted. 
--
Chapter IV 
CONCLUSION 
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So why should the owners and players make these concessions in the next 
collective bargaining agreement? The answer commonly given is for the good of the 
game. However, owners and players naturally want to hear how making these 
concessions will benefit them. This can be demonstrated through the use of a little game 
theory from economics. 
Game theory refers to certain hypothetical situations where participants act out a 
game or situation. There are numerous types of games. The one that applies to this 
situation between both the owners themselves and between the owners and players is 
commonly referred to as the prisoner's dilemma. The situation goes along with it runs as 
follows. Two individuals, player 1 and player 2, are being held by the police in separate 
cells. The police know that the two committed a crime together, but lack sufficient 
evidence to convict them. So the police offer each of them separately the following deal: 
Each is asked to implicate his partner. If neither does so, then each gets no time in jail. 
If each implicates the other, then each goes to jail for a while. If one implicates the other 
but is not implicated, the first gets off (and gets a greater share of the loot), while the 
other goes to jail for a longer period of time. Both individuals rank the alternatives and 
determine the latter to be the best alternative, followed by the first, second, and third 
alternatives in that order. 
--
-
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We can let sl and tl to be the "do not implicate" alternatives and the s2 and t2 as 
the "implicate" alternatives. This provides us with the following picture: 
Player 2 
tl t2 
Player 1 sl 5,5 -3,8 
s2 8,-3 0,0 
Basically, the strategies sl and tl refer to cooperation (with each other and not the 
police), and strategies s2 and t2 refer to noncooperation. 
Both players have the option to cooperate to a greater or to lesser extent. If one 
player unilaterally decreases the level of his cooperation, he benefits and his rival is made 
worse off. If both decrease their level of cooperation, they both are made worse off. 
Understanding how the players will play is simple because s2 strictly dominates s 1 and t2 
strictly dominates ti. Therefore, the participants will play s2-t2. Although this is the 
equilibrium for this game, it is a shame since the outcome is inefficient. This is because 
s I-tl is a better outcome for both sides. 
However, this inefficiency can be resolved by playing the game over and over. 
When this game is designed as a repeated game, it is known as the folk theorem. 
Experiments have been done testing this game. College students play the game many 
times with no fixed horizon in view. As long as they do not see a horizon looming, the 
subjects often cooperate and play s I-t 1. The reason for this lack of short-run optimality 
is that in repeated play there is the long run to worry about as well. If one player tries 
sneaking in s2 to take advantage of the other player in the short run, the other will answer 
--
-
53 
with t2. The players will then realize there is less to gain by optimizing in the short run 
and chose to cooperate. It is important to note that this cooperation is not born out of 
fondness for the other player, but from the self-interested calculation of the benefits and 
losses that may accrue from polite behavior. Therefore, cooperation becomes an 
equilibrium outcome (Kreps 503-505). 
How does this apply to the situation in baseball? First, I will apply folk theorem 
to the agreement among the owners to increase revenue sharing. Baseball is an 
interesting situation because conflicting entities make up the ownership of the sport. The 
league that governs the sport is composed of all the individual owners, who are in 
competition with each other. Therefore, the owners must be sold on the idea that 
cooperating with the competition is better for both sides in the long run. This is indeed 
an example of a repeated game because the teams compete every year. 
To show that cooperation indeed leaves the sport better off, we can make the big 
revenue-generating teams player 1 and the smaller revenue-generating teams player 2. 
Cooperation would then be s 1 and t1 where the big teams share their revenues with the 
smaller teams, and the smaller teams promise to use that money to put a better product on 
the field. This provides the best situation for both sides. If the big teams decide not to 
cooperate and maximize their own situation in the short run, the smaller teams will suffer 
and possibly not be able to compete. If these teams were eliminated from baseball due to 
this inability to compete, baseball would be worse off in the long run. If the smaller 
teams decide to pocket the money to benefit in the short run, the big teams will stop 
playing s1 and not share their revenues. This results in the smaller teams' inability to 
compete. 
-. 
Plus, I would argue that in the long run, this cooperation would result in an 
improved situation for both sides. If these smaller teams use this money to put a better 
team on the field and are able to win, this success will result in increased revenues. 
Examples of this very situation were presented earlier in the paper, such as the Indians, 
Mariners, and Astros. All these teams put together successful seasons and generated 
more revenues. Where the average total team revenues increased 8.8% per year since 
1990, the team revenues for the Indians, Mariners, and Astros increased 41.3%, 17.4%, 
and 13.3% per year respectively. These gains can be attributed to the improved 
performance on the field. With these increased revenues, these teams would be less 
dependent on shared revenues, which would put money back in the pockets of the big 
teams. 
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Folk theorem can also be applied to the collective bargaining agreement between 
the players and owners. In this game, the owners can be player 1 and the players player 
2. Cooperation would result if the owners played s 1 and the players t 1. For the owners, 
cooperation would be granting the players some increased benefits, such as restricted free 
agency instead of arbitration and guaranteeing the players a certain percentage of 
revenues. The players would be cooperating by accepting some of the cost containment 
mechanisms, such as an increased luxury tax and limits on contracts. However, 
cooperation would be the best for both sides. If the owners decide to not grant the 
players anything and attempt to maximize their own profit in the short run, the players 
will surely strike resulting in a catastrophe that baseball might never be able to recover 
from. Should the players decide that there should be no cost containment mechanisms, 
-. 
---
-
revenues would be unable to cover salaries and the owners would have to lock-out the 
players resulting in a similar situation to a strike. 
The key is to find that happy medium where both sides can agree on some 
concessions. I have attempted to find that happy medium through my proposals for 
baseball's next collective bargaining agreement. Through my research of the current 
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state of baseball, I was able to gain a better understanding of the situation and what was 
required to fix it. The picture does not look as gloom as some people are painting it, but 
if baseball does not make some changes, it may get to that point. More than anything, my 
number one request of baseball for the next collective bargaining agreement is that they 
not let the situation get to a boiling point. Remember: cooperation is the equilibrium. 
.-
-
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